Introduction
Scientific Advisory Boards (SABs) occupy an interesting position in the literature on scientific firms' networks. Firms may use SABs to manage knowledge flow via a complicated network grid that consists of individual scientists and universities' nodes. Consequently, firms that are more dependent on scientific knowledge may be more likely to set up SABs. Such knowledge flows are frequently unidirectional, moving from universities to firms, and may be structured as organized economic transactions (Kim and Higgins, 2007) . If firms seek to capture exclusive knowledge, the use of SABs may help in preempting other firms from accessing the same scientists for knowledge resources. That is, firms that seek to capture knowledge but not necessarily to use the knowledge may also have SABs. To the extent that the regulators are also dependent on scientific knowledge, firms that are dependent on the regulator may also be motivated to set up SABs. Clearly, there are potentially multiple functions that a SAB might serve. However, in this paper, I focus primarily on the relationship between the life science firm's dependence on the regulator and the formation of a SAB.
In Section 2, I first examine the relevant literature on the Food and Drug Administration (i.e. FDA) as a science-based federal agency and argue that the FDA relies on basic scientific knowledge * Tel.: +1 213 880 4815; fax: +1 213 740 3582. -mail addresses: jay.chok@gmail.com, inghwee.chok.2011@usc.marshall.edu. that resides primarily in the universities' scientists. Consequently, the firms that are dependent on the FDA may seek to adjust the power imbalance by connecting to these academic scientists. Thus, I posit that a firm's dependence on the regulator would be positively associated with the probability of having a SAB. 1 Because the SAB might serve multiple functions, I also briefly discuss about alternative explanations for why life science firms may have SABs in Section 3. While brief discussions about the SAB have emerged recently in our discipline (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Azoulay et al., 2006; Bagchi-Sen, 2004; Cetindamar and Laage-Hellman, 2003; Murray, 2004; Stephan and Everhart, 1998; Stephan and Levin, 2003; Stuart and Ding, 2006; Stuart et al., 2007; Valk et al., 2004; Zucker et al., 1994) , there is virtually no academic research that focuses squarely on the SABs nested within high technology firms. 2 Nonetheless, whenever possible, I reviewed the literature to provide alternative explanations that are well grounded in the academic literature and control for these alternative explanations. This is followed by a discussion of the dataset and methods in Section 4. In Section 5, I first provide descriptive analyses, 1 It is important to note that I do not discount other possibilities. Firms that are dependent on the regulator could independently access scientific resources other than the SAB. I do not contest that possibility.
E
2 Steven Casper of Keck Graduate Institute had discussed about the role of SABs and some useful affiliation statistics. In addition, Isaacson et al. (1994) published a practitioner article about SAB more than a decade ago. In both cases, a possible relationship with the regulatory environment was not suggested.
including network diagrams of selected life science firms, followed by probit regression analyses. The results suggest that the only variable robust to alternative econometric specifications is dependence on the regulator. As a caveat, there are probably limitations associated with my dataset and analysis. For example, if there are longitudinal data on regulatory dependence and the SAB, it may be possible to capture some of the dynamics related to the hypothesized relationship and thus, the analysis would be more convincing. Unfortunately, firms do not update data on regulatory dependence and the SABs on a regular basis. However, since there is virtually no academic research that focuses squarely on the life science firms' SABs as a dependent variable, an empirical examination should be an important contribution and fruitful in its own right. Moreover, the main contribution in this paper (examining the SABs' relationship with the regulatory environment) appears to be relatively novel.
Regulatory dependence
In the life science industry, significant resources can be unlocked whenever regulated firms receive some rights (for example, approval to proceed with clinical trials, marketing of medical products, etc.) from the FDA (Olson, 1997) . Thus, it can be expected that firms dependent on the regulator may be interested in managing relationships with the regulator to ensure their continued survival (Chok and Sun, 2007; Willman et al., 2003) .
Officially, the FDA is a science-based agency; in the FDA; science is the cornerstone of good regulatory decisions (Henney, 1999) . The rationale for the FDA being necessarily science-based is rooted in a large body of literature that characterizes the FDA as a selfinterested, strategic actor. These studies generally conclude that there are significant uncertainties associated with reviewing drug applications (Carpenter, 2004; Olson, 1997) . Consequently, being science-based is the best defense for the FDA to survive political scrutiny. Prior qualitative research (Jasanoff, 1990; Wagner, 1995) suggests that many federal agencies, including the FDA, can be situated in a hierarchy of control problem (Demski and Sappington, 1987) . For example, the public and/or Congress generally expects the FDA to exercise due diligence when approving or rejecting the firms' New Drug Applications (i.e. NDA) or their variants. However, it is costly for the FDA to acquire expertise and investigate the regulated firms' claims. Moreover, any missteps could result in sanctions and blame imposed by Congress and/or the public. Thus, a self-interested, strategic FDA will seek to avoid accountability (Demski and Sappington, 1987; Gordon and Hafer, 2007; Jost, 1997; Wagner, 1995) . More broadly, the qualitative evidence (Jasanoff, 1990; Wagner, 1995) suggests that the administrators in federal agencies seek to protect their own careers and avoid accountability by characterizing policy choices as matters to be resolved by science. Specifically, federal agencies may appoint external scientists to provide advice or make de-facto decisions on regulatory approvals because "scientific opinions" increase the credibility of the decision made. This helps the federal agencies to avoid accountability and survive external scrutiny (Jasanoff, 1990; Wagner, 1995; Wynne, 1992) . For example, prior to approvals on different phases of any given NDA or its variant, regulated firms are often required to submit and present their evidence to the relevant FDA committees (Thompson, 2000) . FDA committee members are expected to provide independent, professional advice. Records of meetings archived on the FDA website indicate that FDA committee members do vote on regulatory issues at the product level although the final decisions are ostensibly made by FDA (Website: http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory). Indeed, Carpenter (2004) argued that FDA officials took great pains to preserve its reputation of safeguarding America's public health while warding off negative political consequences primarily by communicating frequently with FDA's scientific constituents. These activities include attending professional meetings and giving lectures on particular issues to ensure the FDA perspective is heard. But the most important activity relates to the utilization of FDA advisory committees scientists' advice (Carpenter, 2004) .
The FDA's external scientists are expected to make decisions based on a transparent process that is defensible among scientific peers. According to the FDA consumer, the regulated firm is expected to submit scientific evidence, which is commonly reviewed by a federal scientific advisory committee of external scientists, that proves the product is safe and effective before the FDA will allow the product to go on the market (Thompson, 2000) . In reality, the external scientists review protocols that certify that the evidence is scientifically valid-it is therefore supposed to be safe and effective but may not necessarily be so. Evaluation based on protocols or scientific standards is the norm and tradition of science. Moreover, given the significant uncertainties associated with reviewing drug applications (Carpenter, 2004; Olson, 1997) , it follows that having some stable process of measuring and deciding is desired and maybe even necessary in this industry. In particular, expensive trials and inherent constraints that carry from discovery to development means that most scientists, out of necessity, tend to focus on the protocols and the biomarkers rather than on the actual therapeutic outcomes, which may not necessarily be observable due to the design of the clinical trials. This "less than accurate" feature of scientific evaluation can potentially opens the opportunity for a socially constructed view of science at federal agencies to be much more malleable and less deterministic than the public would perceive. In particular, Wagner (1995) argue that these scientists, who make policy decisions at federal agencies, may deliberately re-characterize the boundary between questions of science and non-science to pursue authority and material resources. Specifically, he said that for trans-scientific 3 issues brought to an agency's scientific body, it is possible for the scientists to substitute their own values for the policy choices needed at the trans-scientific juncture and characterize the final science-policy decisions as the result of scientific judgment and experimentation. To demonstrate that the imputation of scientist's beliefs into science polices is indeed happening, Wagner (1995) illustrated the case of a toxic substance (i.e. benzene). Wagner (1995) observes that sister agencies/departments under the same presidential administration reach wildly different scientific conclusions about the carcinogenic potential of benzene. Wagner (1995) opined that this disparity arises because individual scientists impute their unique biases and unexpressed value judgments into science polices. Indeed, both practitioners and social scientists had pointed out that although the FDA prefers to see data with real end points, it will, depending on the practicality of the situations, accept the use of surrogate points and negotiate the chosen level of significance for end points (Benderly, 2004; Webb, 2001; Wynne, 1992) . Jasanoff (1990) , in her case studies, provided numerous examples. This includes the choice of theoretical models in evaluating exposure pathways/harm mechanism, the preferred observation methods, the scientific models on dose-effect relationship, the subjectivity involved in counting excess tumors, the appropriate extrapolation factor from animal test to humans and the judgment involved in deciding whether observed effects in one tissue is idiosyncratic or can be generalized (for additional examples of how science and policy are socially negotiated, see Coutant (2000) ). Since the research design, the chosen paradigms for ana-lyzing clinical trials results, the acceptable level of harm and what is deemed as acceptable proof are all subject to social negotiation, this suggests that the "science" behind FDA's science policy is malleable (Jasanoff, 1990) .
Overall, to the extent that the FDA is dependent on scientific knowledge, then firms that are dependent on the regulator may be motivated to set up SABs as a means to rebalance the power imbalance. Let me elaborate on the mechanism. What I mean by regulatory dependence is related to Emerson's (1962) powerdependence theory. Emerson (1962) argues that the dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside the A-B relation. Applied to the empirical context in this paper, we can define dependence of a firm upon the regulator as being directly related to the firm's expressed risk preferences associated with investing in the life science industry's prevailing business model, which requires payoffs that are mediated by the regulator. To the extent that the firm does not prefer opportunities outside the firm-regulator relationship and has a major interest in the resources that can only be provided by the regulator (i.e. approvals), the firm is dependent on the regulator and the regulator has power over the firm. Emerson (1962) argued that power-dependence creates imbalances and that the dependent party will seek counter-balance the relationship.
In the current context, because the regulator is dependent on the basic intellectual resources that reside primarily in the academic scientists to evaluate the industry's products, a firm that is dependent on the regulator may be motivated to connect with the academic scientists to rebalance the firm-regulator power imbalance. Note that this argument could potentially be reversed such that an argument could be made for the regulator seeking to rebalance the firm-regulator relationship. Specifically, if firms seek access to a continual flow of basic scientific knowledge to develop new products, it becomes necessary for the regulator to have access to the same type of scientific knowledge to rebalance the knowledge equation. But because my focus is on the firm's regulatory dependence, I will focus on the firm's motivation (Cyert and March, 1963) to rebalance the power equation. In practice, the effect is that both the regulated firm and the regulator need access to the same type of intellectual resources (McComas et al., 2005; Thompson, 2000) .
It is plausible to argue that regulatory dependent firms may attempt to use the SAB to affect the regulatory approval process. Let me elaborate on why. Because of the conflict of interest rules at the FDA, firms are more likely to attempt to influence indirectly rather than exercise direct, overt influence. In this regard, indirect, interpersonal influence is facilitated by the presence of multiple carriers of knowledge. This is because for inter-personal influence to take place, the individuals often need to have something in common. Drawing on Friedkin (1993) and Festinger (1954) , the following arguments can be made. Consider two components of social influence-interpersonal visibility and salience. According to Friedkin (1993) Friedkin (1993) further argue that some form of proximity between the actors ensures that one actor is aware of another actor's opinion and hence interpersonal visibility. Structural similarity among the actors ensures that an actor's opinion is salient to another actor. In other words, some amount of commonality among the actors is necessary to ensure that one is able to influence the other. As Friedkin (1993) Translated to the current empirical context, an implicit assumption for the regulated firm would be that when a SAB scientist and a FDA advisory committee scientist work in the same institutions, they would be aware of each other's opinions. To the extent that they share some overlapping or similar characteristics, it becomes easier for them to influence each other. At the minimum, these are all academic scientists that have ties with the life science industry, whether it is through the regulator or through the private sector. It is therefore plausible to argue these scientists are either aware of or engage in interdisciplinary work-something that is necessary to develop products that worked in humans. Thus, these scientists who work in the same institution may be aware of each other's work and due to the interdisciplinary nature of their work, they share some similarity. But this assumption may not work all the time. Hence, for a regulatory dependent firm, it makes sense to have a SAB that would appoint multiple scientists as board members. It is plausible that the more indirect ties that a firm has, the greater the probability that the firm can influence the regulator because individual ties might fail to perform. Specifically, the firm can transfer information through these ties to influence the opinions of the FDA. I acknowledge that influence can run both ways-a firm with more indirect ties to the regulator could be more susceptible to influence by the regulator. But since influence requires that there be some commonality, the firm is better positioned to influence the regulator if its own opinions are not too dissimilar from the regulator. Thus, while the FDA forms scientific advisory committees, the regulated firms form SABs.
To summarize, the assumptions that the paper developed are as follows. In the current regulated environment, the FDA faces significant uncertainties in reviewing drug applications submitted by regulated firms. Situated in a system of hierarchical control, any missteps by the FDA could result in unintended political consequences. A self-interested FDA will therefore seek to avoid accountability by outsourcing de-facto decisions to external scientists that possess the relevant knowledge to adjudicate the case. At the same time, there is a power imbalance in the firm-regulator relationship, which the regulatory dependent firm is motivated to rebalance. Because of the FDA conflict of interest rules, any attempt to influence should be indirect and less overt. Thus, one plausible way of influencing the regulatory approval process is to appoint an external scientist that is indirectly connected to the FDA. The implicit assumption for the connection is that interpersonal influence often requires that both actors have something in common-working in the same institution to ensure visibility of opinions and structural similarity to ensure salience of opinions. However, individual ties may fail because the tie may not be operative. Having a SAB with multiple external scientists appointed ensure that redundancies is built in to handle the failure of individual ties. Thus, I hypothesize that there may be a positive relationship between dependence on the regulator and the probability of having a SAB.
Alternative explanations
"Scientific Advisory Boards (SABs) have been used for many years by small, start-up companies, especially those funded by venture capitalists. The reasons are obvious, since the raison d'etre for many of these companies was the exploitation of a new scientific idea and technology." (Isaacson, Mitchell, and Starr, 1994) Practitioners sometimes assume that SABs should be especially prevalent among start-up companies funded by venture capitalists. The existence of the SAB could provide a relevant signal to the venture capitalists (Spence, 1973a,b) . This would be similar to what prior research studies found in similar settings. For example, Audretsch (2001) observe that biotechnology firms do their best to communicate to Wall Street that their firms' scientists are highly capable and that the projects the firms are undertaking represents good science. According to Audretsch (2001) , "It is not uncommon for prospectuses to read like proposals to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) ." This signaling argument is not at odds with the argument about uncertainty. Researchers who study status-based signals often argue that status measures highly correlated with quality can be used to signal quality when there are high levels of uncertainty such that the quality is not easily observed to outsiders. Stuart et al. (1999) make a similar point in their study. Specifically, they document that when investors are highly uncertain about the young firms' quality, these firms' affiliations with prominent strategic investors and/or alliance partners can be used as a gauge of the firms' quality. They test this with a sample of venture capital-backed biotechnology firms that are going public. Their study implicitly assumes that it is more difficult for a low-quality firm to partner with high-status organizations. That is, signaling works because the cost of signaling and the quality of the firm is inversely related. Mathematically, this is also known as the single crossing property (Spence, 1973a,b) . In fact, a recent study shows that biotechnology firms nested with senior executives with prominent affiliations are more likely to partner with other biotechnology firms that are also similarly nested with senior executives with prominent affiliations (Kim and Higgins, 2007) .
The presence of signaling potentially suggests that there is asymmetric information in the life science capital marks. This is because according to the economics of information, signaling makes sense only under environments characterized by asymmetric information (Spence, 1973a,b) . Indeed, the notion that information asymmetry exists in the capital markets and firms try, often effectively, to signal their own quality had been validated broadly (i.e. multi-industries studies) both in the financial economics journals and in the sociological journals (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Podolny, 1993 ). In the current context, information asymmetry would mean that venture capitalists are less knowledgeable about the quality of the firms that are working on novel, unproven technologies than the insiders working in the firms. Of course, it is also possible that in the life science industry, even the insiders cannot observe quality easily because the industry is characterized overwhelmingly by uncertainty-no one knows the future. But even in this case, the use of the SAB could potentially reduce perceived uncertainty. According to Isaacson et al. (1994) , SAB members can help to reduce perceived uncertainty for the external investors by providing "an independent overview and critique of the status, direction and viability of the [firm's science]". Likewise, Czarnitzkia et al. (2009) pointed out that "Academic prestige and a strong position in the scientific community reduce uncertainties in the commercialization process and serves as a signal in the post-discovery period. It might play a crucial role in order to attract. . .financiers. . .".
It is therefore logical to assert that the SAB could potentially serve as a signal to the venture capitalists and other alliance partners (i.e. established, large firms) and then later to the primary capital markets. In other words, venture capital backing may be positively associated with the probability of having a SAB. Thus, I control for venture capital backing.
Another potential explanation for why some firms might have SABs is related to knowledge capture. Recent research suggests that science-based firms, besides commercializing knowledge from universities, also engage in knowledge capture (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Cohen et al., 2000; Dunford, 1987; Mansfield, 1986; Zucker et al., 2002) , which is more than mere knowledge transfer. Specifically, firms may or may not commercialize a product after knowledge capture. Firms can use knowledge capture as a hoarding mechanism. For example, the act of filing patents with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) does not commit one to use the patented technology. Likewise, the use of other legal mechanisms such as (1) the imposition of rules on employees and related affiliates, (2) aligning compensation contracts to prevent the leak of knowledge, and (3) isolating the knowledge production unit, can be used to hoard knowledge (Liebeskind, 1997) . Much as firms might form in-house teams to develop collective knowledge that cannot be developed easily elsewhere because individual researchers are vested with partial, specialized knowledge (Liebeskind, 1997) , firms might likewise form SABs to capture a unique recombination of intellectual resources (Schumpeter, 1934) . Moreover, if each SAB member co-owned a share of the collective intellectual resources, the individual scientists serving the SAB would have strong incentives not to disclose the organizational secrets as compared to if these scientists are individual knowledge producers (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Liebeskind, 1997) . In fact, Louis et al. (2001) reported that commercial involvement by university scientists has heightened secrecy (defined as denying research results or materials to academic colleagues) as scientists seek to protect the commercial interests of the biotechnology firms that they are affiliated with and retain their competitive edge by denying information and materials to others. The "natural excludability" of the scientific discoveries/knowledge also allow the scientists to channel knowledge only to strategic partners (Zucker et al., 1998) . Since the SAB is a relatively formalized (Stephan and Everhart, 1998) and thus well-organized way of extracting intellectual resources, it is possible that the firm may set up the SAB to capture knowledge. And if the use of a SAB is associated with the commercialization of knowledge, there would also be an association between the initiation of a SAB and the firm's patenting activity, which is a proxy for knowledge capture (Nelson, 2004; Sampat, 2006; Zucker et al., 2002) . Consequently, knowledge capture activity and the probability of having a SAB may be positively associated. Thus, I control for knowledge capture activities.
In addition, there is also a potential relationship between firm size and the probability of having a SAB. On one hand, it is possible that smaller firms could not afford to conduct all the research in-house and thus must develop organizational structures and/or cultures that are more open to external innovations so that they can leverage external scientists' intellectual resources (Isaacson et al., 1994) . Incidentally, such structures also make them more flexible and thus less likely to suffer from the type of hierarchical inefficiencies exhibited by large firms (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006) . Moreover, early stage work associated with academic science may be less capital-intensive (Stuart et al., 2007) . That is, firm size and the probability of having a SAB could be negatively associated. On the other hand, compared to large firms, small firms that lack resources may be less efficient at research (DiMasi et al., 1995) . In particular, large firms can absorb R&D fixed costs better than small firms because they have a larger customer base and they can exploit complementary strengths in different departments within the firm (Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2007; Fisher and Temin, 1973; Schumpeter, 1942) . Thus, the large firm may be better positioned to exploit the knowledge transfer occasioned by setting up the SAB. That is, firm size and the probability of having a SAB could be positively associated. Regardless of the direction of this relationship, it seems necessary to control for firm size.
It is also possible to argue, to the extent that the firm is a reflection of its top management team (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) , that the firm with a greater number of senior executives with PhDs is more likely to be dependent on academic science. Shared academic and research experiences, particularly in terms of professional norms and knowledge among senior executives with PhDs and university scientists may make it easier for such firms to learn and extract knowledge from the universities (Kim and Higgins, 2007) . In fact, Stuart et al. (2007) recently document that the biotechnology firms with a larger number of scientific founders and advisors do contract (in the form of in-licensing) more with universities, which suggest that the biotechnology firm serves as the intermediary between pharmaceutical firms and universities. In other words, SABs may be prevalent among firms in the life science field and other high technology, science-based industries because of the firms' need to acquire knowledge from the universities.
Alternatively, the relationship between senior executives' career backgrounds and the probability of having a SAB may be a result of status-based homophily. Specifically, recent research has examined biotechnology firms' executives' upstream affiliations. Upstream affiliations refer to senior executives' ties to research oriented organizations such as universities (Baum et al., 2000; Higgins and Gulati, 2003) . The general argument is that status-wise, it is easier for senior executives with upstream affiliations to partner with universities. Given that a typical SAB member tends to be a distinguished scientist from academia (Bagchi-Sen, 2004; Heinonen, 2002; Stephan and Everhart, 1998) , it may be reasonable to conceive the SAB as a form of alliance arrangement between the firm and prominent scientists; the alliance originates from the firm's executives' academic connections. Furthermore, the underlying mechanism for forming a SAB would be to signal to a broader audience of the firm's legitimacy (Higgins and Gulati, 2006) . That is, employing senior executives with PhDs and by extension, forming a SAB using the senior executives' academic connections, are means to signal the firm's status in the scientific order and thus generate credibility about its ability to engage in high quality research (Zucker and Darby, 1996) . Prior research suggests that high-status positions can be strategically used to secure endorsement from prestigious underwriters (Higgins and Gulati, 2003) and to enjoy enhanced IPO performance (Certo, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999) .
Both explanations, (1) dependence on academic science and (2) leveraging on senior executives' upstream affiliations to signal legitimacy, suggest that there is potentially a relationship between the number of senior executives with PhDs and the probability of having a SAB. These explanations need not be mutually exclusive. But it is clear that it would be necessary to control for the number of senior executives with PhDs.
Finally, I control for a set of two-digit standard industrial classification dummies (SIC = 28, 38 and 87), year dummies and the number of S-1 amendments, which proxy for potential errors in firm's submission to the SEC.
Data
Most empirical studies in this subfield focus only on biotechnology firms to the exclusion of other life science firms. However, regulatory-based explanations are less innovation-specific and could potentially be generalized to all firms under the same regulator. Therefore, what I did is to run the analyses on the broader life science sample and replicate the analyses on a smaller subset of drug companies. My sample consists of 208 life science firms that went public on NASDAQ from 1st May 1996 to 31st December 2006. Robust sampling controls were imposed to minimize unobserved heterogeneity. Details on the sampling design is provided in an earlier version of the paper and is available on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN).
My definition of a SAB follows prior research (Isaacson et al., 1994) . According to Stuart and Ding (2006) , a SAB has to be formal and to meet as a group at least once or twice a year. The SAB normally has its own budget and compensate the SAB members with cash payments on a per meeting basis in the range of $500 to $2500 per meeting (Stephan and Everhart, 1998) . In addition, Cetindamar and Laage-Hellman (2003) document that SABs tend to consist of managers and researchers from companies, universities and regulatory agencies with the bulk coming from universities. To ensure I have complete data on these firms with regard to the SAB, I also check the firm's website to make sure that I did not miss out any firm that decides not to mention the SAB in its offering. But if a firm does not report its SAB in websites, press releases and IPO prospectus, I will not know whether the firm had a SAB and disbanded it or decided not to mention it in the IPO prospectus. If such nonreporting of SABs occur at random, the statistical results will not be materially affected. Moreover, I would have already control for the potential errors in a firm's submission to the SEC using the number of S-1 amendments as a proxy control variable. There is however one caveat about my data collection of SABs. It is potentially possible that large and successful firms may systematically not report their SABs on the IPO prospectuses. But this is unlikely to be the case because SEC filings are legally mandated disclosure. That is, there should be systematic disclosure about the SAB, which is why recent research efforts that collected data on SABs had focus on public firms Stuart et al., 2007) . In footnote nine of Stuart et al. (2007) , the authors mentioned that they were able to obtain information about founders and scientific advisors for approximately 70% of the firms. Most of the gaps are concentrated in the early period of the industry when disclosure requirements are less extensive. Because my sample period starts from 1996, it is less likely that the firms going public would omit reporting of the SAB. Moreover, I observe in my dataset that large firms (such as Tularik and Transkaryotic Therapies Inc., which had been acquired) did report SABs. Moreover, logically, as a public firm becomes larger and have more external stakeholders, if the firm does have a SAB, it would benefit the firm to report its SAB. As Isaacson et al. (1994) commented, SAB members can provide advice to the shareholders of large firms on the strength and health of the company's science and technology base. SAB members can also assist in reporting on the firm's technology audit to a variety of external stakeholders. Nonetheless, the readers should still exercise caution in interpreting the results.
Dependence on the regulator is calculated as a score ranging from 0 to 2. I code this information from the risk factor section of the IPO prospectuses. While the risk factors in the IPO prospectuses might appear to be a laundry list, it is important to remember that firms are expected to disclose and properly represent the risks involved in their businesses (Kenney and Patton, 2005) . A firm is considered to be regulatory dependent if the firm's success is dependent on the success of its proprietary products' clinical trials. A firm is also considered to be regulatory dependent if the firm's success is dependent on the success of its R&D alliance, which involves clinical trials with strategic collaborators. Thus, the maximum score for regulatory dependence is 2.
I use the number of patents that the firm has on the date that the firm went public to proxy for knowledge capture activity. Prior research on the role of patents in stimulating innovation is mixed. Firms may not engage in patenting merely to commercialize knowledge. Instead, a firm may use patents to hoard knowledge, which can block rivals' entries into the markets and enhance its bargaining chips at negotiation tables (Cohen et al., 2000; Dunford, 1987; Mansfield, 1986) . This is especially the case in the biopharmaceutical industry where patents are extremely effective in appropriating knowledge (Lim, 2004; Mansfield et al., 1981) . It is therefore clear that patents have tremendous value in the life science industry precisely because each patent capture a knowledge area and thus also exclude other areas. This results in a narrowly defined monopoly market. Overall, it should be unambiguous that patents serve as a useful construct for knowledge capture. The patent data were collected from the USPTO website. I code the information on the senior executives from the IPO prospectuses by reviewing their career histories covered in the IPO prospectuses. The data are available because Regulation S-K, item 401 mandates that the name, age, qualifications and the last five years of experience, for all executive officers and directors must be disclosed in IPO prospectuses. By senior executives, I mean the management team. Thus, the board of directors is excluded. I count the number of senior executives with PhDs. Because the life science firm is knowledge-based, financial measures of firm size may not be appropriate. Therefore, I use Ln(Emp), the natural log of the number of employees, to proxy for firm size. The dummy variable for official venture capital backing came from the SDC database. I also control for year and SIC dummies. Finally, I control for the number of S-1 amendments, which proxy for potential errors in the firm's submission to the SEC.
Econometric model
The dependent variable is binary and either logistic regressions or probit regressions can be used. Logistic regressions, with its odds ratios, are easier to interpret. But logistic coefficients are about 1.8 times larger than probit coefficients (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984) . Thus, the probit regression represents a relatively conservative econometric test. It is also better to use a probit model given my small sample size. However, the probit model assumes that the underlying probabilities of the dependent variable are normally distributed. Because i.i.d assumptions (i.e. independent and identically distributed) may be violated, I adjust the standard errors with the Huber-White sandwich estimator (Wooldridge, 2002) . The baseline probit regression model is specified as follows:
where X is a set of independent and control variables that includes year dummies, SIC dummies, firm size, the number of senior executives with PhDs, two variables on knowledge capture and three variables on regulatory dependence. Here,ˇrefers to a vector of parameters to be estimated from a sample of size n based on observations that range between SAB 1 . . .SAB n . That is, we can write the probability function for the dependent variable inside the likelihood function as
And the log likelihood function is given as
Taking the negative of the second derivative of the log likelihood function, we can write the estimated observed information as
By taking an inverse of the estimated observed information, we can obtain an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters denoted as V. This information can be used in a Wald test to assess whether the coefficient for the dependence on the regulator is significantly greater than the coefficient for a control variable. Here, the Wald test can be written as:
Scientists' affiliation networks: the research institutions between SABs and the FDA
If there is a set of academic scientists' networks that connect the regulated firms to the regulator, there is a possibility that firms with SABs may potentially use the social network infrastructure to exercise an indirect, interpersonal influence on the regulator.
There are of course caveats and assumptions for whether each single path to the regulator is operative. However, first and foremost, it is necessary to document the existence of such a social network infrastructure to add credibility to such an argument. Therefore, I present selected cases' network diagrams that show that both regulated firms and the FDA are connected to the same research universities via academic scientists appointed to the SABs and the FDA advisory committees. These network diagrams are two-mode networks, which I generate with the Organization Risk Analyzer (Kathleen and Matt, 2006) .
To generate the two-mode networks, I code the institutional affiliations of scientists serving on firms' SABs and of scientists serving on FDA advisory committees nested within two FDA centers that are responsible for regulating products targeted for the human medical markets. These two FDA centers are the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (i.e. CDER) and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (i.e. CBER). Both centers have very similar processes in terms of pre-clinical research, clinical studies and New Drug Application (i.e. NDA) reviews. CDER regulates pre- scriptive drugs (branded and generic versions), over-the-counter drugs and therapeutic biological products. CBER regulates blood derivatives, vaccines, cellular and gene therapy, tissue and medical devices that are used in processing, collecting, manufacturing and/or testing biological products. Data on each SAB scientist's primary affiliation is collected from the S-1 that the firm files with the SEC when it goes public. As mentioned, the S-1 is a legal document mandated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Therefore, data integrity is high. Data on each FDA advisory committee member's primary institutional affiliation is collected from the FDA website. 4
Results
One of the most interesting results was that SABs are not as prevalent as academic researchers and industry practitioners would have assumed. For example, an informant told me:
Most pharma/biotech/med device firms have medical/clinical advisory boards. Usually made up of 5-10 key opinion leaders (docs heavily into research & well respected amongst their peers). May meet 1-3 times a year and discuss changes in the medical/clinical environment, give advice to the firm about possible new products in development, how to increase market share for the firms products by using medical marketing tactics or provide any other advice that the firm needs. Effectively, they are consultants to the firm. This kind of taken-for-granted opinions is common but turns out to be false. Instead, in Table 1 , the data indicate that in my sample of 208 life science firms going public on NASDAQ from 1996 to 2006, 52% of the life science firms have SABs.
This distribution is comparable with a smaller study conducted during the period of 1997-1998 where Cetindamar and LaageHellman (2003) found that among a sample of 22 firms in the Ohio biotechnology cluster, 46% of the firms have SABs. By contrast, we see that almost all the life science firms in the sample exhibited regulatory dependence on the FDA. In fact, the median score is 2 (i.e. dependent on the success on clinical trials AND dependent on success of R&D collaborations that involve clinical trials.). The per-Plate 9. Network data from 1998, Basic intellectual resources shared between FDA and Curagen Corp.
centile statistics also suggest that firms are more likely to be regulatory dependent than they are to have a SAB. That is, although firms in the highly regulated life science industry are likely to be involved in product development that requires clinical trials, it is not obvious that these firms would necessarily require the use of a SAB.
We also see in Table 1 that firms also varied widely in terms of the number of patents issued. At even the 25th percentile, there are firms with no patents. In fact, there are sixty-six firms with no patents issued. Among these sixty-six firms, forty-nine firms' primary SIC code is 28, seven firms' primary SIC code is 38 and ten firms' primary SIC code is 87. The firm with the median number of patents is 5. At 90th percentile, the firm has 36 patents issued.
When the sample is broken down into firms with SABs and without SABs, I find some differences based on firm size in Table 2 . Firms with more than 300 employees are proportionally less likely to have SABs. But the drop in the percentage of firms with SABs as firm size increases is not monotonic. The percentage of firms with SABs appears to fall and rise and fall again as firm size increases, which suggests that there are other factors driving the SAB phenomenon.
In Table 3 , the sample is broken down into four-digit SIC groups but also sub-classified by two-digit SIC groups. Most of the firms are in the sub-group where SIC = 28. Within this subgroup, there is a firm that is primary-listed as 2824 and secondary-listed as 2836 (labeled in the SIC manual under Manmade Organic Fibers and biological products respectively). The remaining 157 firms in this subgroup have primary secondary three-digit SIC code, which is labeled in the SIC manual as drugs. Overall, firms in this subgroup can be appropriately described as drug companies. Based on the SIC codes and the business description in the IPO prospectuses, firms in this second subgroup can be appropriately described as medical devices and instruments companies. For the last group, all the firms are primary-listed as 8731 with one exception-one firm is primary listed as 8731 and secondary-listed as 2835. Many are genomics firms that supply technology platform to drug discovery firms. Others are hybrid genomic firms that both sell technology platforms and also enter into strategic alliances with other biopharmaceutical firms to discovery drugs. Some are traditional CROs that have strategic alliances with small biopharmaceutical firms that focus narrowly on drug discovery. These firms can be appropriately described as research-oriented firms.
In Table 4 , the sample is broken down by two-digits SIC groups and further divided based on SAB and venture capital backing. Across all two-digits SIC groups, it is clear that majority of the firms are venture capital backed although the ratio of firms having SABs to the firms without the SABs is roughly similar for both the venture capital sub-sample and the non-venture capital sub-sample.
But industry grouping may still matters along other dimensions. In Table 5 , there are two groups of firms with stable numbers going public in different time periods (SIC = 28 and SIC = 38) but there is one group of firms where the IPO market had a few bad years recently (SIC = 87). However, in terms of firm size, across the SIC groups, most of the firms have less than 200 employees but no major differences exists across the SIC groups. No systematic differences exists across the SIC groupings for the number of senior executives with PhDs within the firms too. Finally, firms do vary widely in terms of the number of senior executives with PhDs. This is consistent with the summary statistics in Table 1 , where there are several firms with only one senior executive with a PhD (10th percentile) and there are also several firms with six senior executive with PhDs (90th percentile). The median firm has three senior executives with PhDs.
In Table 6 , I examine two sub-samples of firms, those with SABs and those without SABs, by the number of senior executives with PhDs. For firms without SABs, the frequency decline as the number of senior executives with PhDs increases. The converse is true for firms with SABs. This provides some support for the notion that as the number of senior executives with PhDs increases, the probability of having a SAB increases. Table 11 Probit models of Scientific Advisory Board with Huber-White Sandwich estimator.
Model 1 Statistical significance for two-tail tests: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, Robust standard errors in parentheses.
In Table 7 , I provide the frequency for each combination of a range of patents issued and number of senior executives with PhDs. Most firms have modest numbers of patents issued and a small number of senior executives with PhDs.
In Table 8 , I examine two sub-samples of firms, those with SABs and those without SABs, by the number of patents issued. While the number of patents issued appears to be positively associated with the percentage of firms with SABs, the relationship is not monotonic. The percentage of firms with SABs peaked at the range of 11-20 patents issued, which suggests a curvilinear relationship between the probability of having a SAB and knowledge capture activity. However, in unreported analyses, I found that both the proxy for knowledge capture and its square term are not statistically significant in probit regressions with the SAB dummy variable as the dependent variable. To ensure that this is not due to multicollinearity, I created two dummy variables: a high variable (number of patent issued greater than 20) and a low variable (number of patent issued less than 11). The results remain statistically insignificant.
In Table 9 , we see that the proportion of firms that are dependent on the FDA do not appear to differ significantly based on the year that the firm went public. But the proportion of firms that depend on the FDA does increases marginally when the SAB size (the number of members that the SAB has) increases. In addition, for SIC = 28, Table 12 Probit models of Scientific Advisory Board with Huber-White Sandwich estimator.
Model 4
Model 5 the proportion of firms that are dependent on the FDA is 94%; much higher than the other two SIC groups (SIC = 38 and SIC = 87).
Network diagrams
In Diagrams 1 and 2, I compare the network diagrams of Tularik Inc. and Trimeris Inc., which have firm size in the 90th percentile and 10th percentile respectively in the years that they went public. Both firms have regulatory dependence scores equal to 2. As discussed earlier, the scientist-institution relationships (two-mode networks) are mapped on the basis of (1) scientists that sit on the focal firm's SAB and (2) In Diagrams 5 and 6, I present two firms that have regulatory dependence scores equal to 2. These firms are also venture backed and had only modest number of patents issued. Seattle Genetics Inc.'s two-digit SIC code is 87 whereas DOV Pharmaceutical Inc.'s two-digit SIC code is 28. In particular, Seattle Genetics Inc. went public in year 2001 with 4 patents issued. It has 6 senior executives with PhDs; 90th percentile in this measure in Finally, in Diagrams 9 and 10 above, I examine the SAB-FDA's network for Curagen Corp and Advancis Pharmaceutical Corp. Both firms have regulatory dependence scores equal to 2. Curagen Corp went public in year 1998 but was acquired by Abbott Laboratories in year 2001. It had 14 patents issued at the time of IPO, which would fall under the 11-20 patents issued band in Table 8 . Curagen Table 13 Probit models of Scientific Advisory Board with Huber-White Sandwich estimator for three-digit SIC = 283.
Without year dummies
With year dummies Statistical significance for two-tail tests: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, Robust standard errors in parentheses. The visual presentation of these networks, selected on various dimensions, adds credibility to the idea that there exists a social network infrastructure that indirectly connects the life science firms with SABs to the regulator. We will now proceed to test whether regulatory dependent firms will be more likely to have SABs.
Statistical analyses
In Table 10 , I present the Pearson correlation matrix among the independent variables. The low correlations suggest that there will not be any serious multicolinearity issues. In Table 11 , I present probit models of SABs with Huber-White sandwich estimators.
I find that venture capital backing does not significantly predict the probability of having a SAB. In addition, subsequent probit regressions yield beta coefficient estimates and standard errors that suggests venture capital backing has very little to do with SABs. If the SAB were to serve as a perfectly effective signal to the venture capitalists, we should observe that having a SAB should be a necessary prerequisite to receiving venture capital backing. It follows that by the time firms go public, all venture capital backed firms should have SABs. However, as mentioned earlier in Table 1 , 83% of the firms in the sample are venture capital backed, which suggests that it is much more likely that a firm received venture capital backing than has a SAB-an empirical proof by counter example. Moreover, in Table 4 , I find that the ratios of firms with SABs to firms without SABs are comparable for venture capital backed firms and non-venture capital backed firms. Therefore, one possible interpretation is that there may be no systematic relationship between venture capital backing and the SAB and thus, the SAB is not likely to be used as an effective signal to venture capitalists. But this does not necessarily mean that life science firms do not signal to the venture capitalists. Firms might signal via other mechanisms. For example, by accepting contractual design that incorporates the allocation of rights, the staging of capital and risk-shifting (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) , firms can self-select and disclose relevant information to the venture capitalists (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . It is also possible that firms were utilizing other social ties that were more effective in overcoming information asymmetry (Shane and Cable, 2002) or uncertainties. In addition, the reader should exercise caution with the statistical inference discussed because there is a remote possibility of systematic non-reporting of SABs by large and successful firms.
In Table 11 , model 3, firm size (the natural log of the number of employees) is negatively associated with the probability of having a SAB. This suggests that smaller firms that lack the resources to conduct all the research in-house were able to develop organizational structures/cultures that leverage on external scientists' intellectual resources (Isaacson et al., 1994; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006) . Indeed, in Table 12 , the sign of the firm size variable's beta coefficient remains stable across models with alternative econometric specifications. Except for model 8, the relationship also remain statistically significant (p < 0.05) across models. In addition, from model 6-9, the relationship between the probability of having a SAB and the number of senior executives is statistically significant (p < 0.05). As mentioned earlier, it is likely that both status effects and the effects of the firm's need for academic knowledge are present in the given context Gulati, 2003, 2006; Kim and Higgins, 2007; Stuart et al., 1999 Stuart et al., , 2007 Zucker and Darby, 1996) . From model 4 to 9, the relationship between the probability of having a SAB and the proxy for knowledge capture is statistically insignificant across the models.
To be comparable with prior research that uses a narrower sampling frame I replicate my analyses with a reduced sample for firms with primary SIC code equal to 283. When year dummies are included, there were two observations for 1998 that predicted success perfectly. I dropped these two observations when year dummies are included in the probit regressions. In Table 13 , I use a reduced sample of 157 firms (without year dummies) from model 10 to 13 and a reduced sample of 155 firms (with year dummies) from model 14 to 17. From model 10 to 17, the empirical relationship between the proxy for knowledge capture and the probability of having a SAB continue to be statistically insignificant. Thus, while it is theoretically plausible that firms might use SABs to capture knowledge (Liebeskind, 1997; Schumpeter, 1934; Zucker et al., 1998) , the empirical evidence suggests the null hypothesis fails to be rejected. In addition, throughout model 10-17, the sign for the firm size variable's beta coefficient remain unchanged but the relationships are no longer statistically significant. And the relationship between the probability of having a SAB and the number of senior executives continues to be statistically significant in Table 13 with two exceptions (model 13 and model 17).
Finally, I find strong empirical support for my hypothesized relationship: firms that are dependent on the regulator are more likely to have SABs with statistical significance. As shown in Tables 12 and 13 , this relationship is robust to alternative economic specifications including subsets of regulatory dependence (clinical trials versus clinical trials with alliance partners) and differing sampling frames. Because the regulatory aspect of the industry is not necessarily the major reason for having the SAB, it is helpful to assess whether the estimated coefficients for the regulatory dependence variables are significantly larger than the estimated coefficients for the control variables. To ensure comparability, I first convert the raw values into standardized values. Since the estimated coefficients for firm size have negative signs, results relating to firm size are included just for completeness sake. Rather, the comparisons are made mainly with the other control variables-venture capital backing, the number of patents and the number of senior executives with PhDs.
The results in Table 14 suggest that the effect of regulatory dependence is either greater or comparable to that of the other control variables. However, the reader needs to be cautious in interpreting the table given that each variable could proxy for multiple effects.
Conclusion and limitations
In this paper, I use social network analyses to document the existence of a social network infrastructure that indirectly connects the life science firms with SABs to the regulator. The presence of the multiple indirect ties creates the possibility for the regulated firm to influence the regulator based on social mechanisms relating to visibility and salience of opinions (Festinger, 1954; Friedkin, 1993) . Although individual ties may fail because the assumption of interpersonal influence as delineated earlier may not be operative in every case, the use of SABs with multiple scientists appointed provide some redundancies in these indirect firm-regulator networks. In accordance with power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) , it is plausible that regulated firms may want to have SABs to rebalance the power imbalance and hence affect the regulatory approval process. Controlling for alternative explanations, I established empirically that regulatory dependent firms are more likely to have SABs. The Wald test statistics also indicate that relative to the alternative explanations, regulatory dependence is plausibly a good enough reason to have a SAB. Moreover, because the literature is likely to focus more on the technological aspect of the drug discovery phase, scholars working in the "management of biotechnology companies" subfield are less likely to point out regulatory-related reasons for having a SAB. By focusing on regulatory-related reasons for having a SAB, I hope to highlight an area that has traditionally received less attention from the researchers working in this subfield.
There are several limitations and unexplored territory that I hope will spur further research on SABs. First, to control for several alternative explanations and to ensure some degree of parsimony, I have selected variables that may proxy for multiple effects to avoid including too many variables, which may result in an overdetermined model. As long as the correlations between my variable of interest and the remaining control variables are not too high, it should be safe to make some statistical inference about the relationship between the dependent variable and my variable of interest. But this means that the multiple effects within each control variable are not investigated fully. For example, while we know, because of the current empirical study, that having PhD holders in the top management team is positively correlated with the probability of having a SAB, we cannot simply attribute this to the need to acquire knowledge from the universities because the outcome is also affected by status effects (Kim and Higgins, 2007) . Future research should tease out the multiple effects in each control variable, which is out of the scope of this paper. Second, the reader needs to exercise caution in interpreting the non-significant finding related to venture capital backing. This paper is not really designed to test the relationship between the SAB and the capital markets. To fully understand the role of the SAB in signaling to venture capitalists in specific and capital markets in general, it may be necessary to develop a new research design. Finally, the SAB is likely to be important to drug discovery. Future research should examine the connection between drug discovery and the SAB more deeply.
